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Much has been achieved to date in containing the ﬁ  nancial stability risks that hedge funds could pose, 
while avoiding unnecessary restrictions that would distort market forces and prevent hedge funds from 
continuing to play their role in today’s markets. But in a continuously changing ﬁ  nancial market environment, 
sustained attention is required by market participants and supervisory authorities to assess ongoing market 
developments and address any weaknesses in counterparty risk management practices and market 
discipline at an early stage.
Dealers in the aggregate appear to be fairly well protected at present against the direct counterparty credit 
risks from hedge fund defaults, but the robustness of margining practices to a major deterioration in market 
conditions and liquidity needs to be examined further. The broader ﬁ  nancial effects, via a deterioration in 
market liquidity and prices, from a market shock affecting hedge funds and other leveraged institutions 
remain difﬁ  cult to gauge. This highlights the importance of improved stress testing and scenario analysis 
practices. A critical challenge in this regard will be to ensure improved assessment and mitigation of tail 
risks by all key participants in the system, so that unrealistic expectations that risks can be transferred to 
others do not lead to moral hazard and wider risks to the ﬁ  nancial system.ARTICLES
Mario Draghi: “Hedge funds and ﬁ  nancial stability”
38  Banque de France • Financial Stability Review – Special issue on hedge funds • No. 10 • April 2007
T
he ﬁ  nancial stability issues posed by hedge 
funds and by highly leveraged institutions 
(HLIs) more generally have been of close 
interest to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) ever 
since the FSF was created in 1999, in the wake of the 
LTCM and Asian crises. This interest has reﬂ  ected 
the growing and constantly evolving role of hedge 
funds in the international ﬁ  nancial system, which 
has kept them very relevant to the FSF’s mandate 
to assess vulnerabilities, identify and oversee action 
needed to address them, and improve co-ordination 
and information exchange among the various 
authorities responsible for ﬁ  nancial stability.
Indeed, the rapid growth of the hedge fund industry 
has been one of the most striking features of the 
changes in ﬁ  nancial markets in recent years. Their 
numbers have doubled since 1999, and their funds 
under management have tripled. Although still small 
when compared to the asset holdings of traditional 
institutional investors, hedge funds as a class punch 
well above their weight.  Reﬂ  ecting their agility, their 
use of leverage, and their extremely active trading 
styles, hedge funds today account for a signiﬁ  cant 
–and in some areas dominant– share of turnover in 
key ﬁ  nancial markets.
Hedge funds provide liquidity and price discovery 
in many markets, and represent further avenues for 
the distribution of risk within the system. They have 
fostered innovation in market practice, and in so 
doing, helped usher along the development of the risk 
transfer markets that are central features of modern 
ﬁ  nancial systems. Reﬂ  ecting this, a growing share 
of the earnings of the traditional core intermediaries 
in the ﬁ  nancial system –the major commercial banks 
and investment banks– now derives from servicing 
hedge funds, and the business model whereby 
these ﬁ  rms increasingly package and transfer risk 
for others to bear could hardly have developed so 
rapidly without hedge funds as active takers and 
traders of those risks.
The recent rapid growth of the hedge fund sector 
has occurred during a period of unusually benign 
macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial conditions. The sector 
may well have contributed to this environment as 
active absorbers of risk. But there are understandable 
questions about the risks that the growth of hedge 
funds and new instruments may pose if economic 
and market conditions were to become signiﬁ  cantly 
less benign. One issue is the extent of direct risk 
that the leverage run by hedge funds could pose to 
lenders. Another relates to the impact of a ﬁ  nancial 
shock on market liquidity and asset prices more 
generally. Here, an important question is whether 
more sophisticated risk management practices and 
the explosion in the trading of structured products 
have led participants to take on greater risk 
exposures than they might otherwise have, on the 
assumption that tail-event risks will be borne by, or 
can be transferred to, others in the event of market 
difﬁ  culties. If so, such “moral hazard risks” could 
impose signiﬁ  cant externalities on other market 
participants.
This article brieﬂ  y reviews the stability concerns 
associated with hedge funds and highly leveraged 
institutions over the years and the progress that has 
been made in addressing them.
1| THE FSF’S 2000 
REPORT ON HLIS
One of the FSF’s ﬁ  rst projects following its creation in 
1999, in the wake of the LTCM and Asian crises, was 
to assess the challenges posed by HLIs to ﬁ  nancial 
stability and to achieve consensus on the supervisory 
and regulatory actions which would minimise their 
destabilising potential. Those challenges, as seen at 
the time, reﬂ  ected two ﬁ  nancial stability concerns 
brought to the fore by the near-collapse of LTCM 
and the Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis. The ﬁ  rst, associated 
with the LTCM episode, was how best to address 
the systemic risks arising from excessive leverage 
and the potential impact on markets and regulated 
ﬁ  rms of a sudden collapse of an unregulated HLI. 
The second was related to market dynamics issues 
associated with the potential for large concentrated 
positions seriously to amplify market pressures in 
small and medium-sized open economies.
This work, carried out by a Working Group on HLIs 
under Sir Howard Davies, the head of the UK FSA, 
resulted in the publication in 2000 of a report1 which 
made 10 recommendations listed in the Appendix 
to this article. These recommendations brought 
together and complemented the recommendations 
and initiatives by a number of other organisations 
1 http://www.fsforum.org/publications/publication_21_25.htmlARTICLES
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at around that time.2 Although many changes have 
taken place in the hedge fund sector since then, the 
broad principles behind the recommendations in the 
FSF’s 2000 report remain relevant and are therefore 
worth recalling.
The FSF’s view was that the challenges to stability 
from hedge fund activity were best addressed 
though an approach that bolstered market discipline, 
including to avoid a build-up of leverage that could 
cause strains for counterparties and markets. To this 
end, many of the recommendations in 2000 aimed at 
improving counterparty risk management practices 
and the provision of information between market 
participants.
Among the recommendations, stronger risk 
management was called for both at hedge funds and 
at their counterparties. Naturally, improving risk 
management at the hedge funds’ key counterparties 
–the major investment banks and commercial banks– 
is not a question of addressing their hedge fund 
exposures in isolation. It is inherently part of a wider 
programme of improving groupwide risk management 
and controls. At the same time, effective counterparty 
risk management practices by regulated institutions 
are a fundamental means of containing excessive hedge 
fund leverage. Effective risk management depends 
on reliable information. While the information that 
matters for counterparty risk management can and 
should be obtained in large part bilaterally, the report 
also recommended enhanced public disclosure of risk 
proﬁ  les, both by HLIs and more generally, so as to 
further strengthen market discipline and the stability 
of the overall system.
A lesson of past market cycles and crises is that 
risk management practices might be vulnerable to 
erosion by competitive pressures. The 2000 report 
therefore recommended sustained enhanced 
regulatory and supervisory oversight of HLI credit 
providers to monitor their adherence to newly 
established sound risk management procedures 
and to encourage the conduct of meaningful stress 
tests. The report also supported the proposal of the 
Basel Committee to develop a more risk-sensitive 
approach to capital adequacy regulation, and called 
for enhanced national market surveillance, to help 
to provide useful early warning signals about rising 
leverage and about speculative pressures and market 
responses to uncertainty about fundamentals.
The FSF followed up the implementation of the 
above recommendations in progress reports in 2001 
and 2002. By the time of those reports, progress in 
strengthening counterparty risk management and 
regulatory oversight of HLI credit providers was 
found to have contributed to a reduction of leverage 
in the system. However, competitive pressures on 
credit standards remained a concern. The Forum 
encouraged further work on the measurement of 
credit providers’ potential future exposures and in the 
conduct of comprehensive stress tests. It also called 
for further sharing of information internationally 
among supervisory and regulatory authorities on 
counterparty risk management practices in the HLI 
industry.  Improvements – albeit inconsistent – had 
been made in the disclosure of information by HLIs 
to credit providers, with little progress on public 
disclosure. The FSF encouraged adoption of the 
recommendations of the Multidisciplinary Working 
Group on Enhanced Disclosure, which aimed at 
improved and more comparable risk-based public 
disclosure by all types of ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
including hedge funds.3
One area where notable progress had been made 
was in prompting leading market participants to 
agree Good Practice Guidelines for Foreign Exchange 
Trading to help address concerns that large and 
concentrated HLI positions could have the potential 
to inﬂ  uence materially market dynamics in small 
and medium-sized open economies.  Since the Asian 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, concerns about the building of large, 
concentrated positions in small or medium-sized 
open economies have abated signiﬁ  cantly.
2| MARKET CHANGES
AND EVOLVING CONCERNS
In the period since the 2002 progress report, the 
hedge fund sector has expanded greatly and hedge 
funds have become an increasingly important source 
of diversiﬁ  cation for investors and liquidity for 
markets. The increasing institutionalisation of their 
2  Including the US President’s Working Group (1999), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999), the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (1999), 
and the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (1999).
3 See  http://www.fsforum.org/publications/publication_20_64.html.ARTICLES
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investor base and sophistication of risk management 
and controls at the largest hedge funds have in 
some respects incorporated them more into the 
mainstream of ﬁ  nancial markets. But hedge funds 
remain very diverse in their size, sophistication and 
strategies, and there are few generalisations that can 
be made about funds as a whole. Many improvements 
in market and supervisory practices have been 
made that help address stability concerns, but the 
increasing complexity of products and markets 
pose fresh challenges. Policymakers and the private 
sector therefore continue to face a variety of issues 
concerning this rapidly growing and innovative 
sector and, where appropriate, have taken initiatives 
to address them.
In particular, in recent years national supervisors 
have intensiﬁ  ed their monitoring of counterparty 
relationships with hedge funds. Perhaps one of the 
most prominent examples of ongoing monitoring is 
the UK FSA’s six-monthly survey of prime brokers 
to assess their exposure to hedge funds and gauge 
broader market risk proﬁ  les. The UK FSA also uses 
this information to identify the need for more direct 
dialogue with and surveillance of managers of the 
“higher impact” hedge funds in the UK market.
National supervisors in the major ﬁ  nancial centres 
–working through the Joint Forum– have also 
reviewed stress testing practices at key ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, including the nature and management 
of exposures to hedge funds and private equity funds. 
While risk management and stress testing practices 
have strengthened over recent years, the rapidly 
changing ﬁ   nancial environment, the entrance 
of new market participants, and ﬁ  rms’ changing 
business activities have highlighted the need for 
continued improvements. Supervisors have pointed 
to weaknesses in ﬁ   rm-wide aggregation of risk 
exposures, assessing the interaction of correlated 
risk factors under stress, and assessing market 
liquidity dynamics under stressful conditions.
In 2005, the Counterparty Risk Management Policy 
Group II (CRMPGII) issued a comprehensive update 
of its 1999 study of counterparty risk management 
recommendations. The report focused principally 
on risk management, risk monitoring and enhanced 
transparency, but it also covered recommendations 
to strengthen the infrastructure of the ﬁ  nancial 
system. In addition, it addressed the operational and 
reputational challenges faced by market participants 
with regard to the management of complex ﬁ  nancial 
instruments, notably credit derivatives.
Heightened market sensitivity to the latter issues 
proved helpful when in 2005 the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York and the UK Financial Services Authority 
encouraged major ﬁ  rms and their counterparties 
to take concerted action to address conﬁ  rmation 
backlogs in the credit derivatives markets and to 
end the assignment of trades without the consent of 
all parties. Good progress by major ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, 
together with other supervisors and regulators, 
has since been made in improving these and other 
aspects of the trading and settlement infrastructure 
for credit derivatives. The good cooperation between 
the private and public sectors provides a model for 
future work in other areas.
The increasing complexity of ﬁ  nancial products, which 
in some cases can be highly structured and illiquid 
with valuations that need to be marked to model 
rather than directly observed from market prices, 
has also led to a greater focus on the quality of hedge 
fund measurement and disclosure of balance sheet 
valuations and risks. This has prompted IOSCO to 
develop for consultation with the industry principles 
for hedge fund managers in relation to areas such as 
valuations, risk management and operations.
Most recently, the US President’s Working Group  (PWG) 
released a set of principles and guidelines regarding 
private pools of capital. These aim to enhance market 
discipline and oversight, given the changes in the 
industry since the PWG’s 1999 hedge funds report, 
by providing guidance to private pools of capital 
(including hedge funds), investors, counterparties, 
creditors, regulators and supervisors.
3| A  LOOK AHEAD
Much has been achieved to date in containing the 
ﬁ   nancial stability risks that hedge funds could 
pose, while avoiding unnecessary restrictions that 
would distort market forces and prevent hedge 
funds from continuing to play their valuable role 
in today’s markets. But in a continuously changing 
ﬁ  nancial market environment, sustained attention 
is required by market participants and supervisory 
authorities internationally to understand ongoing 
market developments and potential implications for ARTICLES
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stability, and to address any identiﬁ  ed weaknesses at 
an early stage. Going forward, ﬁ  nancial authorities 
will therefore be continuing to take a close interest in 
this area, and to coordinate action internationally to 
promote ﬁ  nancial stability, improve the functioning 
of markets, and reduce systemic risk.4
Systemic risk is the potential for ﬁ  nancial distress 
to spread across ﬁ  nancial institutions with possible 
effects on the real economy; it can be propagated 
either through defaults in interlocking counterparty 
credit exposures that affect core financial 
intermediaries, or through a steep decline in asset 
liquidity and asset prices. Being able to assess the 
degree of systemic risk that might arise from hedge 
funds therefore requires that supervisors have good 
information on major dealer ﬁ  rms’ direct exposures 
(as prime brokers or otherwise) to hedge funds. 
It also involves evaluating the risk that hedge fund actions 
(perhaps through sudden changes in risk perceptions 
or forced liquidations of positions) might cause 
a sharp deterioration in market liquidity and prices.
The evidence from the work of supervisors in the key 
ﬁ  nancial centres suggests that, after taking account 
of the use of collateral and margin, the current 
exposures of major dealers to hedge funds, as well 
as their potential future exposures as measured by 
risk models, are in aggregate modest. Dealers in the 
aggregate thus appear to be fairly well protected at 
present against the direct credit risks from hedge 
fund defaults. Nevertheless, competitive pressures 
for hedge fund business appear to have led to some 
cases of weakening in initial margining practices. 
The robustness of margining practices to a major 
deterioration in market conditions and liquidity 
–and the relationship between margin, other credit 
terms and the amount of capital allocated by dealers 
to hedge fund counterparties– needs to be examined 
further. Supervisors are working to better understand 
the remaining uncertainties in these areas.
Meanwhile, the broader ﬁ   nancial effects, via 
a  deterioration in market liquidity and prices, 
from a market shock affecting hedge funds and 
other leveraged institutions remain difﬁ  cult  to 
gauge. This is because the new products and 
markets that have developed in the benign market 
conditions of recent years remain untested and, 
more fundamentally, because it is very difﬁ  cult to 
predict how market participants will react in any 
extremely stressful environment. This highlights the 
importance of improved stress testing and scenario 
analysis practices by market participants that 
provide a portfolio-wide measure of counterparty 
risk sensitivities under severe stress scenarios and 
that incorporate interactions between counterparty 
sensitivities and proprietary risk positions. And, as 
noted in the introduction, a critical challenge in this 
regard will be to ensure improved assessment and 
mitigation of tail risks by all key participants in the 
system, so that unrealistic expectations that risks 
can be transferred to others do not lead to moral 
hazard and wider risks to the ﬁ  nancial system.
4  The FSF is working on an update of its 2000 report, as requested by the G7 in February 2007.ARTICLES
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APPENDIX
Recommendations of the FSF Working Group 
on Highly Leveraged Institutions
5 April 2000
The Working Group recommended a package of responses, which it considered to be consistent, complementary 
and commensurate to the problems identiﬁ  ed. A strong theme uniting most of these measures was the critical 
importance of promoting and sustaining adjustments in ﬁ  rm behaviour and enhancing market discipline. The 
ﬁ  rst eight recommendations set forth below relate predominantly to systemic risk issues, while the last two have 
particular relevance to market dynamics issues.
• Stronger counterparty risk management. Improved counterparty risk management is critical to addressing 
concerns about the accumulation of excessive leverage in the ﬁ  nancial system. All ﬁ  nancial institutions 
acting as counterparties to HLIs should review their counterparty risk management arrangements against the 
recommendations promulgated by the Basel Committee, IOSCO and Counterparty Risk Management Policy 
Group (CRMPG). These cover: ﬁ  rms’ overall risk management framework; systems for counterparty credit 
assessment and on-going risk monitoring; exposure measurement methodologies; limit setting procedures; 
collateral, documentation and valuation policies and procedures; legal risks; and systems for reporting to senior 
management. Where those arrangements are inadequate, ﬁ  rms should not operate in highly risky and volatile 
instruments and markets, or with counterparties offering positions in such markets. Regulators and supervisors 
should reinforce this message.
• Stronger risk management by hedge funds. Some hedge funds have prepared sound practices for risk management, 
internal controls, disclosure/transparency and documentation and have promoted increased informal dialogue 
with market authorities. That is encouraging. It is crucial that such practices permeate throughout the hedge fund 
community.
• Enhanced regulatory oversight of HLI credit providers. Enhanced regulatory and supervisory oversight of 
credit providers is needed to ensure that sound practices are pursued and recent improvements in practices 
are locked in. Supervisors and regulators in all countries should take appropriate steps to determine the 
extent of institutions’ compliance with the Sound Practices promulgated by the Basel Committee and IOSCO 
(in conjunction with the recommendations of the CRMPG) and take action where they identify deﬁ  ciencies. 
That may involve: greater intensity of supervisory and regulatory oversight of regulated institutions which fall 
short of sound practices; requiring regulated institutions to provide periodic afﬁ  rmations of their compliance 
with sound practices; greater use of the supervisory review process following ‘Pillar II’ of the Basel proposals5
and restricting the ability of ﬁ  rms to carry on business with HLIs where they consider that ﬁ  rm’s counterparty 
risk management practices to be deﬁ  cient.
• Greater risk sensitivity in bank capital adequacy regulation. The Working Group supports the objective of 
the Basel Committee consultative document to revise the Capital Accord. This should increase the degree of 
risk sensitivity in bank capital adequacy regulations.
5  “A new capital adequacy framework”. Consultative paper by the Basel Committee (June 1999).ARTICLES
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• Sustaining industry progress. There are important areas of counterparty risk management where further 
work is required, both at the industry level and in individual ﬁ  rms. These include reﬁ  ning measurements of 
potential future exposure, developing better stress testing, the development of liquidity risk measures, collateral 
management techniques and use of external valuation. The Working Group has encouraged the formation of 
a small group consisting of representatives of the Basel Committee and IOSCO to assess industry progress in 
these areas.
• Building a ﬁ  rmer market infrastructure. The Working Group strongly commends further steps to improve 
documentation harmonisation across different products, collateral practices and valuation practices. National 
authorities should work to ensure that their bankruptcy laws allow certainty to market participants that positions 
can be closed and collateral realised in such an eventuality.
• Enhanced public disclosure by HLIs. The Working Group ﬁ  rmly supports the objective of enhancing public 
disclosure by HLIs and endorses US efforts to achieve this through both regulation and legislation. It calls on all 
jurisdictions to consider the adequacy of their own disclosure requirements and introduce, where necessary, 
appropriate changes to legislation or regulations to ensure that major funds located in their jurisdictions are 
subject to complementary disclosure requirements. This recommendation should also apply to offshore centres, 
particularly those which currently host large unregulated hedge funds.
• Enhanced public disclosure practices generally. The Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced 
Disclosure endorsed by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) provides an important opportunity for movement 
towards improved and more comparable risk-based public disclosure among all types of ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
including hedge funds. The Working Group urges ﬁ  rms taking part in the study to take full advantage of the 
opportunity to engage in a forward-looking and practical discussion of how disclosure practices should be 
improved.
• Enhanced national surveillance of ﬁ  nancial market activity. Authorities should consider strengthening 
market surveillance at the national level with a view to identifying rising leverage and concerns relating to 
market dynamics and, where necessary, taking appropriate preventive measures. There are also improvements 
to market transparency which might be of value to market participants and the ofﬁ  cial sector alike. Particular 
areas that could be explored include enhancing existing foreign exchange and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
markets data, for example by broadening currency breakdowns.
• Good practice guidelines for foreign exchange trading. Leading foreign exchange market participants should 
review and, as necessary, revise existing market codes and guidelines and take the responsibility of articulating 
model guidelines of good trading practices in the light of concerns expressed about trading behaviour in foreign 
exchange and related markets. These could serve as a starting point for local adaptation in individual emerging 
market economies.